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BRIEF OF RESPO:lDENT

STAT81E"IT OF CASE

The appellant, Craig Rees, has appealed fran the decision
of the Honorable Venoy Christopherson, Judge, First Judicial District
Court, granting a surrmary judgment in favor of the respondent,

Albertson' s Inc.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

It is from the sumnary judgment granted the respondent and
the order of the court denying appellant's notion for review that
this appeal is made.

STATE11ENI' OF FACTS
On or about the rrorning of Septanber 3,

1974, appellant P.ees

and McGehee purchased some beer; the appellant does not remember where.
Later that rrorning, the two mentioned above, picked up Harris and
Andrews.

The four then bot1g..ht rrore beer, allegedly from respondent

Albertson's Inc., and a fifth of 100 proof liquor fran the State Liquor
Store.

The four then drove to Bear Lake and on the way, appellant and

McGehee were mixing the liquor wi.t..h their beer.
20:2-4).

(Langford Dep. 15 : 9-19;

They drove into Idaho where additional beer was purchased.

While returning to Logan, they experienced a seriot!s auto!IDbile accident
wherein Andrews and McGehee were killed and Harris injured.

(R22)

As a result of the deaths and injury appellant Rees made payment
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in satisfaction thereof in total settlement of $54,742.50.

Appellant

Rees then brought suit against respondent Albertson's Inc. for contribution pursuant to the Comparative Negligence Act of Utah, Utah Code
Annotated 78-27-39 (1953, as amended).
On or about April 22, 1977, respondent filed a motion for

sumiary judgment, (R35), which was supported by a merrorandum, (R36).
On or about May 5, 1977, appellant filed a mem:rrandum in opposition to

respondent's m:>tion for surrmary judgment, (R44).

Thereafter, respondent's

counsel, Stephen G. furgan, and appellant's counsel, John M. Chipm3I1,
stipulated that the clerk of the court would not be advised that the 1111tter was ready for decision (pursuant to Rule 2. 8 of the Rules of Practice
for the District Courts of the State of Utah) until respondent had an opJXll
ttmity to file an Affidavit of Newell G. Knight, (R48).

On or about May

27, 1977, the court, being unaware of said stipulation, filed its rnarorandum decision denying respondent's motion for sumnary judgment, (RSS).
Thereafter, on June 17, 1977, Mr. furgan received and filed the Affidavit
of Newell G. Knight (R49, 51).

On July 5, 1977, the court wrote a letter

to Stephen G. furgan with a copy to John M. Chipman, which stated as follm.
"In view of the affidavit of Mr. Newell G. Knight,
the court feels it is in order to review its decision
and i;.rntld suggest a motion to review or set aside the
decision in order that counsel for the plaintiff would
have time for an appropriate response to said motion."
(See Exhibit A attached) (R54)

Thereafter, on or about July 8, 1977, respondent filed a motion to review
and set aside the order denying respondent's m:>tion for su:rmrry jud~t
which was supported by the Affidavit of Newell G. Knight, (RSS, RS8) ·
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Thereafter, on or about August 3, 1977, appellant filed a cotmter-affidavit
of Stewart C. Harvey, (R63).

On or about August 9, 1977, respondent filed

a memorandum in reply to the affidavit of Stewart C. Harvey, (R66).

On

or about August 17, 1977, appellant filed by mail a request for oral argument on respondent's notion to review, (R70) .
On or about August 23, 1977, the court filed its IllfflOranch.m deci-

sion granting respondent' s rrotion to review and set aside the order denying
respondent's notion for suarnary judgment and granting suarnary judgment in
favor of respondent, (R71).

On or about August 30, 1977, appellant filed a

rotion to review and set aside the order granting respondent's rrotion for
sumary judgment, (R76).

On or about October 26, 1977, the court filed its

mem:>randum decision denying appellant's notion to review, (R79; see also App.
Brief p. 5).
ARGUMENT
POINI' I
1HE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ER..ll IN GRANI'm'.; RESPONDENT'S
MOITON TO REVIE.W AND SET ASIDE AN ORDER DENTIN; RESPONDEITT Is MOITON FOR SUM1ARY .JUIG1ENI'

The court granted respondent's notion to review the court's denial
of its rrotion to suarnary judgment in accordance with Rule 60 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 60(b) (1) provides:

Ch notion and upon such tenns as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable neglect.
In this case the mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or excusable ne-

glect occurred when the respondent filed its IIDtion for sumiary judgment with
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-4its supporting merrorandum and appellant filed its merrorandum in oppositic·
to the rrotion for surrmary judgment and both entered into a stipulation t~
neither would notify the clerk of the court to submit the matter for decision until respondent had had an opportunity to file an affidavit of Nei·:e'
G. Knight.

The court being unaware of the stipulation, elected to decide

respondent's rrotion before either appellant or respondent had contacted ti.clerk of the court to notify him that the matter was ready for decision in
accordance with Rule 2.8 of the Rules of Practice in District Court of the
State of Utah.
Pursuant to Rule 60 U. R. C. P. respondent made its rrotion to revie.
After considering the motion to review and the accompanying affidavit file:
by respondent and appellant's counter-affidavit, the court granted responik1
motion to review and granted surrmary judg;:nent in favor of the respondent.
In Meagher v. F.quity Oil Co. , 5 Utah 2d 196, 299 P. 2d 827 (1956) ,

the court held that:
It is well established that the court may vacate, set
aside or modify its orders or judgments entered by mistake
or inadvertance which do not accurately reflect the results
of its judgfllf!Il::s.
In the present case, the trial court ruled on the m::ition for sunmary judg·

ment prior to having considered the respondent's affidavit or appellant's
counter-affidavit.

After the trial court became aware of this additional

information, the court felt that "it is in order to review its decisions and suggested that counsel file a notion to review or set aside the
decision in order that counsel for the plaintiff have time for an approprL~
response to said motion."

(See Exhibit "A" attached) .

Thereafter, the
I

court waited for both sides to file all the rrotions and rnerrorandums they IE-
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sired and after reviewinz the same, the court then co=ectly granted respondent' s TIDtion to review and surrrrary judgnent.
In 60 C.J.S. 94 (Motions and Orders §62(1), it provides that:

A court, while retaining jurisdiction over the cause
in the progress of which it made an order, may, for suffi-

cient cause shown, amend, resettle, nodify, or vacate the
order.
This appears to be the general rule in nost jurisdictions, including Utah.
In Re Estate of Mecham, 537 P.2d 312 (1975), involved a lower

court that had granted a notion to strike objections to an accounting
of an estate.

The notion to vacate that order was held to be the effec-

tive order in the case.
Through dicta, the court in Luke v. Coleman, 38 Utah 383, 113
P. 1023 (1911), said:
According to some of these decisions (speaking of
decisions in other jurisdictions cited earlier in the
case), a second application for a new trial may be made
within the term in which the judgment was rendered, when
it is based on grounds not included in the first application, and satisfactory reasons given for the anission.
(The procedural rules involved in Luke are materially the same as the

current rules.)

These exanples vxruld clearly indicate that there exists

a nDtion to review a prior order, both in case law and in the statutes.

Drury v. ll.m.ceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 P.2d 662, (1966), and
!Jtah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, 24 Utah 211, 469 P.2d 1
(1970),

the~

cases used by the appellant in its brief in support of

its position are distinguishable from the present case.

In the ~

v. Lunceford, case supra, from which the appellant quotes dicta, the
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court speaks of a rrotion to review a gr3Iltin.". or denyinp; of a motion
for new trial not being in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

It is

significant to note that later in that case the court says that:
It should be observed that what we have said herein
is intended to apply to the fact situation shown in the
instant case wnere, pursuant to regular procedure, the
court has acted deliberately and advisedly in granting
the new trial. However, we also recognize that there may
be situations where an order denying or granting a new
trial may have been made by inadvertence or mistake,
or where there was some irregularity in connection with
the obtaining or the granting of the order, in which
instance the court could of course act to correct any
such mistake or irregularity.
In the present case the court did not have access to the affidavits and

thus did not act advisedly in denying respondent's rrotion for s=.ary
jud~ent.

This inadvertence or mistake justified the trial court in

reviewing the denial of respondent's rrotion for surrmary judgi:nent and,
in fact, the court suggested that a motion to review or set aside "-Uuld
be appropriate under the circumstances.

(See exhibit A attached)

In Utah State Employees Credit Union v. Riding, supra, while

doubting that a rrotion to reconsider a

jud~ent

denying a rrotion to

vacate judgpient is authorized under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
the court looked at the merits of the rrotion.

After finding no merit

in the notion and that the opposing party had not received notice of
the notion, the court ruled that the trial courts acting on and hearing
the motion was error.

In the present case the appellant had notice of

the motion to review and the accompanying affidavit, and pursuant to
such, appellant filed a counter-affidavit.

The mistake and inadvertence
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involved in not providing the trial court with all of the information
prior to its denial of the rrotion for sumnary judgment and the subsequently provided infonnation to the trial court with the rrotion to
review, show good merits upon which the court could base both hearing
and acting on the notion to review.

In addition, the court suggested

that a rrotion for review or set aside would be appropriate under the
circumstances.

(See Exhibit A attached).

Thus the trial court did not err in granting respondent's
rrotion to review and set aside an order denying respondent's l!Otion
for sumnary judgment.

POINr II
1HE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANrING RESPONDENT'S
MJI'ION FOR SUMr1"..ARY JUDGMENT
There is no conflict between the opinions of respondent's
expert and those of appellant's expert.

Therefore, there is no dis-

pute of fact and the trial court's granting of respondent's nntion for
smmary judgment was correct.
Appellant's expert, Stewart C. Harvey, states that in his
opinion, "it is possible to detennine that the alcohol from the beer
purcbased from Albertson's (respondent) and consuned by Plaintiff Rees
(appellant) was still in Mr. Rees' (appellant's) system at the tilre
of the accident in question and therefore \.X:luld contribute to Plaintiff's
(appellant's) intoxication at the time of the accident in question."
Respondent's expert, Newell G. Knight, states that in his
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opinion, "there is no way in which it is possible to calculate the
arrDlmt of intoxication, if any, that could have resulted from the beer
purchased from Albertson's Inc. (respondent) .
opinion, it

~uld

In other words, in my

be irrpossible to detennine whether or not the beer

purchased from Albertson's (respondent) was a proxinate cause of Plaintiff's (appellant's) intoxication at the time of the accident in question."
Appellant argues that these h-D opinions are in conflict and
that the granting of sumnary judg;:nent was error by the trial court because there is a dispute of facts.

In reality the h-D opinions are not

in conflict and therefore, there is no dispute of fact.
Assuming that appellant's expert is correct that some of the

beer purchased frc:rn respondent was still in appellant' s system at the tin
of the accident, that does not mean, ipso facto, that whatever anDunt
that was left in appellant's system was a proximate cause of appellant's
intoxication at the time of the accident.

Section 41-6-44(b)(l), Utah

Code Armotated 1953, was amended, provides that i f there was at that tirr
0.05 percent or less by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, it shal.
be presumed that the person was not tmder the influence of intoxicating
liquor.
Therefore, in the present case, if the arrotmt of respondent's
beer left in appellant's system at the time of the accident was 0.05
percent or less by weight of alcohol , then respondent' s beer left in
appellant's systan was not a proximate cause of appellant 's intoxicaticm
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The n-xi experts do not contradict each other, the only difference
between the two is that respondent's expert goes one step further in
the analysis than appellant's expert.

Appellant's expert says that since

some of the respondent's beer remained in the appellant's system at the
time of the accident it contributed to his intoxication.

Respondent's

expert says that even if this is true "it is impossible to calculate the
anmmt of intoxication, i f any, that could have resulted from the beer
purchased at Albertson's (respondent's)".

Appellant's expert does not

purport: to suggest what the aroount of intoxication, if any, the respondent's beer caused, since as respondent's expert stated that would be
impossible to determine.

There are no issues of fact to render a surrmary

judgment :inproper.
Rule 2. 8 of the Rules of Practice in District Court of the State
of Utah, (e) provides that a "party resisting the rootion may request
oral argument and such request shall be granted i.mless the UDtion is
denied.

If no such request is made, oral argument shall be deaned to

have been waived."

In the present case the appellant filed its counter-

affidavit on or about August 8, 1977, yet did not make a request for
oral argument until on or about August 17, 1977.

That delay and the

fact that the merrorandum decision granting the UDtion was issued on
August 23, 1977, i:.uuld indicate that the trial court i:.uuld be justified
in deaning the request for oral argument was waived by the appellant.
Even if the court -was not so justified, the facts that appellant now
believes create an issue of fact were well laid out in the counter-
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affidavit before the trial court \·.nen it ruled on the I".Dtion for sumrar,·
judgment.

Hence, if there was any error, it was only harmless error

and v;ould not have changed the granting of sunrnary judgrr.ent in favor of
respondent.
COt"lClliSim

Respondent submits to the court that surrrr.ary judgp1ent in favor
of respondent was warranted and should be affirmed.

RESPECTFUILY submitted this

~ J.

day of March, 1978.

IDRGAN, SCAUEY, LUNI' & KIMBIE

~""~~~
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I delivered two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent to J. Kent Holland, Esquire, Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant, at his office at 702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah,
84101, this .J!!!!la_y of March, 1978.
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Stephen G. Morgan
Attorney at Law
Suite 200 State Exchange Building
345 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Craig Rees vs. Albertson's Inc.
Civil No. 15841

Dear Mr. Morgan:
In view of the affidavit of Mr. Newell G. Knight,
the Court feels it is in order to review its decision
and would suggest a motion to review or set aside the
decision in order that counsel for the plaintiff would
have time for an appropriate response to/said m. otion.
Sincer0ly,

1·1'

J~

. ·

I i ;f/ ,',' d-!f---;_,-/-'
///

/;

/ ,1 ,,

veN y 'dhrt~tloff~r~ri
District/ Judge ./
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7 S Z-3 ::O<l 2

Re:

...,....,, ...

John M. Chipman

JUL OG 1977
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